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Abstract 
Health  has  become  a  dominant  economic  and  political  issue  over  the  past  40  years,  with 
nations experiencing rapid rises in health care spending, and the health sector presenting high levels of 
expansion, rationalization and organization. I describe how by the end of World  War II, both the 
intellectual and financial resources were being made available to answer the emerging empirically-
driven questions for a new applied branch of economic analysis: Health Economics. I also discuss the 
driving forces for the evolution of this new field, while identifying two distinct paths in health economic 
thought: the first rising from a territory previously ploughed, namely by Mushkin (1962), and later 
developed by Grossman (1972; the second of which stemming from Arrow’s 1963 paper ‘Uncertainty 
and  the  Welfare  Economics  of  Medical  Care’,  a  singularity  amongst  his  mathematical  economics 
pearls. Blaug remarked, in 1998: “health economics would seem to be a perfect topic for heterodox 
dissent and yet, surprisingly enough, radical economists and Marxists have not on the whole been 
attracted to health economics”. My view is this could have been because “mathematical economists” 
stepped forward and challenged themselves to solve problems such an unorthodox market posed. 
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After  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  in  1945,  the  health  sector  experienced  high  levels  of 
expansion, rationalization and organization. Health was redefined as “a state of complete physical, 
mental  and  social  wellbeing  and  not  merely  the  absence  of  disease  or  infirmity”  (World  Health 
Organization, 1947).  With this definition health began to be seen in its social context, as a human 
capacity to cope with the environment and everyday life.  
In fact, since then, health care suffered a genuine “revolution”, particularly staged in the U.S., with 
dramatic  increase  in  the  knowledge  of  means  for  diagnosing  and  treating  illness.  Fifty  years  ago, 
physicians  were  little  more  than  diagnosticians,  their  activities  being  essentially  "limited  to 
identification of . . . illness, the prediction of the likely outcome, and then the guidance of the patient 
and his family while the illness ran its full, natural course"  (Report of the President' s Biomedical 
Research Panel 1976, appendix A, p. 3). Now, we have sophisticated solutions to what used to be 
complex,  or  even  ‘impossible’  problems:  kidney  dialysis,  organ  transplants,  polio  vaccines, 
arthroscopic surgical techniques, CT scanners, nuclear magnetic resonators, in vitro fertilization. As 
recently as a decade ago, heart and liver transplants were virtually unknown, while today being widely 
used.  
Today,  the  United  States  is  alone  among  developed  nations  with  the  absence  of  a  universal 
healthcare  system,  presenting,  however,  significant  publicly  funded  components:  Medicare  for  the 
elderly  and  disabled,  with  a  historical  work  record  and  Medicaid,  for  indigents,  provide  taxation-
financed  coverage.  Employer  benefit  based  health  insurance  remains  quite  common  with  larger 
employers. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a component of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS), administers Medicare and Medicaid. 
 
 
                                                 
* The author is indebted to R. E. Backhouse and P. Teixeira for their guidance and comments. He is also grateful to the 
Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia for financial support. 
1 It is universally recognized that Health Economics had its origins in the USA, so most of this essay’s references, as to both 
the context, and the literature, are American.  
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The AMA and U.S. politicians: a late 40s-60s “tug-of-war”?  
The creation of a new powerful authority: Medicare.  
The American Medical Association (AMA) was created in 1848, having as main goals scientific 
advancement, creation of standards for medical education, launching a program of medical ethics, and 
obtaining improved public health. Yet, it was only in 1931 that economic concerns came to the agenda, 
with the creation of the AMA Bureau of Medical Economics, established to study all economic matters 
affecting the medical profession.  
On another field, in 1935 the Social Security Act was approved by President Roosevelt, then Social 
Security in the U.S. covering unemployment insurance, besides the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. Social insurance was being created and the reform extended to 
the health sector by former World War II Vice- President, then President Truman, a defendant of a 
universal  health  insurance  program,  who  in  1946  signed  the  National  Mental  Health  Act,  while 
developing and presenting a plan for National Health Insurance for his 1948 reelection, immediately 
followed by  a consistent AMA campaign against it.  In 1947, Truman  stated "[o]f all our national 
resources, none is of more basic value than the health of our people." In his 1948 address, he said "[t]he 
greatest gap in our social security structure is the lack of adequate provision for the Nation' s health." 
His support for this reform "evolved from his dismay that one-third of the men reporting for the draft 
during World War II were physically unfit to serve. What’s more, Truman' s populist foundation was 
shaken by the economic inequalities of medical care" (Greenberg, 1993). 
The  American  Medical  Association  was  a  very  powerful  force  and  dominated  "interest-group 
activity in the health policy arena" (Mayes 2004). With endless funds, the AMA attacked Truman' s 
proposals as Communistic, during a Cold War era, and ultimately destroyed any chance of success for 
Truman’s  proposal,  even  though  supported  by  public  opinion,  usually  fearing  major  governmental 
intervention. It would only be in 1960 that the AMA would develop national policy on health care for 
older patients. It allowed for the building of foundations for the creation of Medicare. Though AMA 
managed to delay it, through its vehement 1950s and 1960s campaign against Medicare, it was finally 
signed into law on July 30, 1965 by President Johnson, as part of his Great Society programs
2. The 
AMA  lobby  still  campaigns  to  raise  Medicare  payments  to  physicians,  arguing  that  increases  will 
protect seniors'  access to health are.  
 
                                                 
2 At the bill-signing ceremony President Johnson enrolled former President Truman as the first Medicare beneficiary and 
presented him with the first Medicare card, as a recognition for all of his effort.   4 
Health Economics is born? 
Though  Milton  Friedman  had,  from  1929-1936,  studied  some  issues  concerning  differences  in 
inequality of income among professions such as those of a dentist or physician, namely due to the 
highly  individualized  nature  of  the  service  and  the  qualitative  range  in  the  performance  of  these 
functions, he had focused, up until then, mostly on statistical issues in his research
3. It is precisely in 
the late 1950s and beginning of the 60s that Economics begins it’s incursion on Health issues. One of 
the first authors to define Health Economics as a specific discipline is Selma Mushkin
4 in her 1958 
“Toward a Definition of Health Economics”. Muskin traced the recently acquired interest in this sector 
precisely to the advance of medical techniques, and to the consequent problems of the financing of 
costs for medical care. Her contribution is undeniable for the definition of a newly “born” subject, 
enhancing  the  error  incurred  by  the  “health  administrator”  as  equating  “health  economics”  with 
“money questions in the field of health”, and defining it as a broader science “concerned with the 
optimum use of scarce economic resources for the care of the sick and the promotion of health, taking 
into account competing uses of these resources”. Later, in 1962, with Health as an Investment, she 
argues people develop themselves by investing in health services and education, with a future return 
associated with it. Interestingly, a similar argument would be followed later on by Grossman, in 1972, 
obtaining a much wider academic recognition. I discuss this later on. 
We can say Health Economics, as a discipline, had been launched, approximately around the same 
time as Economics of Education and other applied fields, both making use of Human Capital Theory, 
yet, until today, this discipline’s “official birth” is still attributed, by many, to Rational (or Social) 
Choice Theorist Kenneth Arrow, and his 1963 article, in what I shall call the official recognition, or 
“baptism”, of Health Economics.    
 
 
2. Rational Choice Theorists and the “baptism” of Health Economics during the 
Cold War 
Behind the curtain: The RAND Corporation and the Ford Foundation 
 
                                                 
3 As exemplified by his dissertation on Incomes from Independent Professional Practice published with co-author and thesis 
advisor Simon Kuznets, in the National Bureau of Economic Research Bulletins,1939. 
4 Mushkin accumulated the job as an economist for the Division of Public Health Methods, Public Health Service, and as a 
research associate at the John Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health.   5 
The RAND Corporation 
The RAND Corporation
5 was set up in 1946 by the United States Army Air Forces as Project 
RAND,  under  contract  to  the  Douglas  Aircraft  Company,  and  in  May  1946  they  released  the 
Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship. In May 1948, Project RAND was 
separated from Douglas, the split being sponsored by the Ford Foundation, and became an independent 
non-profit organization, to "further promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the 
public welfare and security of the United States of America."  Its self-declared mission is "to help 
improve policy and decision making through research and analysis".  
Initially, RAND focused on issues of national security, during the Cold War, the period of 
protracted conflict and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies 
from the late 1940s until the late 1980s. It is considered to have been the very first think tank, and 
represented, to the Soviets “[a]n American Academy of Death and Destruction”
6. Eventually, RAND 
expanded its intellectual reserves to offer insight into other areas, such as business, education health, 
law, and science. RAND' s innovative approach to problem solving has become the benchmark for all 
other think tanks that followed. The achievements of RAND stem from its development of systems 
analysis. Important contributions are claimed in space systems and the United States'  space program, in 
computing and in artificial intelligence. RAND researchers developed many of the principles that were 
used to build the Internet. Numerous analytical techniques were invented at RAND, including dynamic 
programming, game theory, the Delphi method, linear programming, systems analysis, and exploratory 
modeling. RAND also pioneered the development and use of war-gaming. 
 
The Ford Foundation 
The Ford Foundation was chartered on January 15, 1936 by Edsel Ford and two Ford Motor 
Company  executives  "to  receive  and  administer  funds  for  scientific,  educational  and  charitable 
purposes, all for the public welfare". After the deaths of Edsel Ford in 1943 and Henry Ford in 1947, 
the presidency of the Ford Foundation fell to  Edsel' s oldest son, Henry  Ford  II.  Under Henry  II' s 
leadership,  the  Ford  Foundation  board  of  trustees  commissioned  a  report  to  determine  how  the 
foundation should continue. The committee, headed by California attorney H. Rowan Gaither, former 
assistant director of MIT’s Rad Lab, recommended that the foundation should commit to “promoting 
peace, freedom, and education throughout the world”. The board of directors then decided to diversify 
                                                 
5 RAND is an acronymic name, resulting from the contraction of “Research ANd Development” 
6 Kraft, “RAND: Arsenal for Ideas,” at 69, in Amadae, 2003    6 
the foundation' s portfolio and gradually divested itself of its substantial Ford Motor Company stock 
between 1956 and 1974. By this time, Ford was clearly the richest American philanthropy.  
In my view, this was clearly a time where the Foundation redefined itself, both in terms of 
goals,  which  now  transcended  the  mere  charitable  purpose,  clearly  acquiring  a  more  political 
dimension,  and  of  leadership,  gradually  cutting  its  ties  to  the  Company
7,  and  having  Gaither  as 
chairman of the board. 
What I believe is worthy of emphasis is the fact that Gaither, while chairman of the board for 
the Ford Foundation, was also the chairman for RAND, undisputedly proving the strong links between 
the sponsor giant, and the recently “independent”, sponsored non-profitable RAND, the 50s think tank 
icon of Cold War America. Furthermore, during this time, Gaither was invited by President Eisenhower 
to head a committee to study the American civil defense program, having he produced the top secret 
“Gaither Report”, which in the end gave origin to the (fallacious) assertion of a ‘missile gap’ between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, leading the charge for civilian control of the Pentagon, starting with a 
complete reform of the defense department based on the tools of rational management.  
This was, therefore, clearly a time when both the institutions clearly articulated with the State, 
and its military concerns on a Cold War era, Ford contributing with the money, RAND with the brains 
for the operations.  
Roelofs  (2003)  reports  that  John  J.  McCloy,  while  chairman  of  the  Foundation' s  board  of 
trustees
8, "...thought of the Foundation as a quasi-extension of the U.S. government. It was his habit, 
for instance, to drop by the National Security Council (NSC) in Washington every couple of months 
and casually ask whether there were any overseas projects the NSC would like to see funded." 
RAND has, since then had numerous notable participants, ranging from Nobel prize winning 
economists, namely Arrow, Simon, Nash, Schelling, and Phelps to politicians, namely modern-day 
ones,  such  as  Donald  Rumsfeld  (former  Chairman),  Secretary  of  Defense  for  the  U.S.,  and 
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State for the U.S, both former members of RAND’s board of trustees. 
Today the Ford foundation remains a national and international foundation with headquarters in 
New York City and offices in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Russia. To this day, the 
program areas of the foundation advance the goals outlined in the Gaither Committee report. The Ford 
                                                 
7 Note that in the beginning of the 60s the Foundation was still strongly connected to Ford Motor Company, then presided 
by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. (see also note 10).   
8 Former Assistant Secretary of War, during World War II, advisor to John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, 
Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, McCloy was chairman of the Ford Foundation from 1958 to 1965; he was also a trustee 
of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1946 to 1949, and then again from 1953 to 1958, before he took up the position at Ford.    7 
Foundation has been accused of supporting many progressive causes. It is a major donor to the Fairness 
and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), a self-described progressive media watchdog group. Certain critics 
have criticized the Foundation for alleged links with the CIA. 
 
RAND, Ford and Rational Choice Theory: context for the “baptism” of Heath Economics 
The new science of decision-making provided by game theory proved to be suited to the cold 
war tactical and strategical “game” played between the United States and the Soviet Union, finding 
itself  a  home  in  Santa  Monica:  the  RAND  Corporation.  Here,  Game  Theory  was  enthusiastically 
developed between the late 1940s, and the 50s. This was a new approach to finding optimal solutions 
for  human  action  in  strategic  and  uncertain  scenarios,  without  resorting  to  traditional  constrained 
optimization problems of scarce resource allocation. Soon Game Theory, then as a “new science of 
choice” and study of human interaction, spread to all kinds of different areas, from political science, 
sociology  and  psychology  to  biology,  becoming  this  “rationality  project”  instituted  as  a  study  of 
collective or individual decision-making, where the actors’ individual interaction could be  equated 
through mathematical formalism, producing collectively rational outcomes (Amadae, 2003; Mirowski, 
2002). This “escape from psychology” meant cleansing neoclassical theory from any psychic concepts 
of economic behavior such as pleasure, motivation and utility, among others (Giocoli, 2003).  Soon this 
science spread its wings through most of RAND’s departments and agenda, from political and military 
decisions  regarding  the  ‘missile  gap’  and  the  Sputnik  shock,  in  1957,  to  domestic  policymaking, 
namely in the Health department. President Johnson’s Great Society programs, Medicare having been a 
product of them, as previously mentioned, took use of these new decision technologies, as “policy 
analysis” became an accepted manner of making foreign and domestic policy judgments. 
Rational choice theory was claimed to be devoid of ideology and based entirely on scientific 
principles, and in this context they were formulated, directly addressing policy questions of equity and 
distributive fairness. Arrow
9' s impossibility theorem, for example is rooted on a conception of social 
justice based on carefully argued principles and articulated in mathematical terminology. He argued 
that social preferences (social welfare) should come as a result of aggregated individual interpersonal 
comparisons of preferences, and that the “political procedure of majority ballot will generally produce 
social rankings of  alternatives that violate that ‘social welfare  function’” (Mirowski, 2002).  In  the 
                                                 
9 Arrow was, undoubtedly, directly linked to the RAND Corporation, during the Cold War era:  “I spent the summer of 
1949 as a consultant of the Rand Corporation…There was a philosopher on the staff, named Olaf Helmer…He was troubled 
by the application of game theory when the players were interpreted as nations…I assured him that economists had thought 
about the problem…He asked me to write an exposition…” (Arrow, ‘The Origins of the Impossibility Theorem’ In Lenstra 
et al., 1991, pp. 1-4 (1991))   8 
Health Economics context this tendency manifested itself in what was to be considered the launch of 
such a discipline: Arrow’s 1963 paper “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care”. 
Financed  by  the  Ford  Foundation,  interested  in  collecting  papers  in  the  developing,  both 
technologically  and  politically,  Health  sector,  it  was  to  be  integrated  in  a  series  of  papers  on  the 
economics of health, education and welfare, and was supposed to address the medical market. 
Arrow starts off by evaluating the distance of this industry to the “norm”, that is, “perfect 
competitiveness”, insisting on the predictive value of a model, rather than explanatory, following a 
Friedman philosophy. This is a good example of the attempt to apply such rational choice theories to 
the health industry by the 1972 Nobel Prize winning inventor of them, himself. After exploring some of 
the  particularities  of  the  health  market,  he  redefined  optimal  Pareto  equilibrium  as  one  which 
maximizes welfare (even if at the expense of sacrificing some self-interest, provided much greater 
benefits come to others, which compensate for these losses). Then government intervention would be 
warranted for two reasons: either there is an absence of Pareto Optimality; or it exists with a socially 
inequitable health outcome. Therefore, provided the allocation mechanism in the market works, social 
policy needs only to confine itself to redistribution, that is, public policies. This was consistent with 
Arrow’s later redefinition of rationality: “the major meaning of rationality is a condition of consistency 
among choices made from a different set of alternatives” (Arrow, 1996, cited in Giocoli). 
10 
 However, what is interesting to note, and in fact has been the focus of all later references in 
Health Economics literature, is that when further characterizing this potentially allocating efficient 
market, Arrow addresses issues such as the non-marketability of goods, which results from spillovers 
or externalities inherent to them, due to market imperfections, as well as issues such as the omnipresent 
uncertainty. This uncertainty would be present in the numerous agency relationships (the physician-
patient, with physicians detaining privileged information, insurance schemes-physician and patient-
insurance  schemes)  which  are  dominated  by  asymmetric  information,  therefore  sustaining  moral-
hazard situations, in the evaluation of the quality of the simultaneously produced and provided medical 
service, in pricing policies, and in the unpredictable nature of demand itself. Arrow concludes as to the 
impossibility of a competitive equilibrium, even controlling for uncertainty, in such a singular market, 
and I firmly believe, implicitly (and at times explicitly) recognizes the influence of ‘irrationalities’, 
ranging from politics to emotions and the role of an individual’s private network in assuring credibility 
                                                 
10 This would mean that the conditions to rationality would have evolved from the traditional maximization approach (i.e., 
the  reasoned  pursuit  of  self-interest)  to  the  consistency  view,  translating  this  consistency  into  extra,  non-economic 
restrictions placed upon the agent’s behaviour, redefining this agent, through a purely formal representation, as any kind of 
decision-maker: human, individual, collective, institutional or even as a computer. In the words of Nicola Giacoli, the rise of 
this consistency approach had ‘forced neoclassical economics to abandon no less than its major theoretical goal, namely, the 
explanation of the individual’s behaviour’ (also consistent with Mirowski, 2002).   9 
and reputation (later, in 1988, Pauly addresses this). Accordingly, an interesting aspect he considers in 
this article is the exceptional characteristics and ethical duties of the medical profession, which should 
have a collectivist orientation given the necessary existence of a trust relationship with both patient and 
insurance schemes.  
In sum, Health Economics had been born and officially ‘baptized’ under the protective shadow 
of rational choice theorists, in a post-military context, having the RAND Corporation and the Ford 
Foundation as godparents. It had, however, been definitely considered a singular offspring, having 
Arrow enunciated most of its particular, ‘irrational’ forces. 
 
 




RCT and public choice theorists’ politics 
During the Cold War the profound overlap between the two worlds of academic choice theory 
and public and social policy (namely in the Health department) remained yet too evident. The network 
of  RAND  scientists  and  researchers  involving  rational  choice  theorists  (RCT)  such  as  Schelling, 
Ellsberg and Raiffa, was strongly imbedded both in the military departments, as was the case of the two 
first, who incorporated McNamara’s
11 Department of Defense team, and in the intellectual, academic 
world, both Schelling and Raiffa occupying prominent academic posts in the Harvard University’s John 
F. Kennedy School of Government, ‘molding’ the intellects of future public policy makers. In the late 
40s,  and  the  50s,  there  was  sharing  of  resources  by  RAND  and  the  Chicago-based  Cowles 
Commission
12,  and  by  the  60s  this  network  was  actively  participating  in  Public  Choice  Society 
                                                 
11 McNamara was chosen by President Kennedy to serve as his Secretary of Defense, after he had assumed the presidency 
of Ford Motor Company one day following the election. Therefore, though McNamara’s takeover of the Pentagon was 
actually made possible by the set of decision-theoretic and management tools supplied to him by RAND staff, besides the 
‘Gaither Report’, he was already familiarized with rational management techniques he used at Ford (he had joined the 
Company in 1946 as manager of planning and financial analysis).  
12 Arrow is precisely, and most probably, one of the most relevant examples, in the health economics context, of this sharing 
of intellectual resources (and influences), which allowed for mathematics, game theory and other rational ‘tools’ to find 
their way into economics, social and public choice policy making. In his 1972 autobiography he wrote:  
" The brilliant intellectual atmosphere of the Cowles Commission, with eager young econometricians and mathematically-
inclined economists under the guidance of Tjalling Koopmans and Jacob Marschak, was a basic formative influence for me, 
as was also the summers of 1948 and subsequent years at the RAND Corporation in the heady days of emerging game 
theory and mathematical programming. My work on social choice and on Pareto efficiency dated from this period.” 
 (from Nobel Lectures, Economics 1969-1980, Editor Assar Lindbeck, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 1992)  
   10 
meetings,  and  giving  shelter  to  political  science  students  from  the  University  of  Rochester,  who 
participated in Summer workshops held at RAND (Amadae, 2003). 
   Naturally, this had its effects on the increasingly interventionist policies on the Health sector, as 
was observed in cases such as President Johnson’s Great Society Programs, which namely had as 
consequence  the  creation  of  Medicare  (and  Medicaid)  in  1965.  Rational  policy  analysis,  including 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting  and  cost-effectiveness  analysis,  became  confirmed  as  decision-
making methods as they became institutionalized as “social practices carrying the weight of social 
decision”, rather than actually having been demonstrated their credibility and worthiness (Amadae, 
2003).  
This was the scenery in the 60s, when policymakers were engaged in a vigorous debate (namely 
involving  the  AMA)  about  how  health  care  should  be  financed.  I  would  now  like  to  address  two 
important occurrences, in the light of this context. Firstly, this was the time when RAND Health was 
created, as a department thought to continue the tradition of improving policy and decision-making 
through research and analysis. To provide a factual basis for the debate, in 1971 the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services, of the United 
States Public Health Service) funded the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, a 15-year, multimillion-
dollar  effort  that  to  this  day  remains  the  largest  health  policy  study  in  U.S.  history.  The  study' s 
conclusions  encouraged  the  restructuring  of  private  insurance  and  helped  increase  the  stature  of 
managed care. It was to have a major influence in the development of Health Economics post-cold war 
literature of the 80s, which I will address, further ahead.  
The effects over health economics literature of this strong influence of rational choice over 
public  choice  theory  are  yet  too  evident  in  the  second  occurrence  I’d  like  to  discuss.  The  U.S. 
government, also through the United States Public Health Service, sponsored one of the most important 
articles  in  the  field  of  Health  Economics.  Pauly’s
13  The  Economics  of  Moral  Hazard:  Comment, 
published in 1968, and written under the supervision of James Buchanan
14 was precisely a comment on 
Arrow’s 1963 paper. Arrow had identified uncertainty as a source of market failure, to be countered by 
insurance against medical care expenses, in order to assure social welfare, either to be provided through 
government intervention, or by the market. Yet, competitiveness and optimality would still encounter a 
barrier in uncertainty, which would allow for moral hazard, since the lowering of marginal cost of care 
to the patient, due to insurance,  could increase  unnecessary usage.  I believe Pauly comes with an 
                                                 
13 Interestingly, since 2003, Pauly integrates the National Advisory Council of the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and is part of the Medicare Technical Advisory Panel.  
14 James Buchanan won the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics, mostly for his work on public choice theory.    11 
attempt to “salvage” Arrow’s (conscious, or not) “escape from RCT” when describing the non optimal 
health care market. Under the supervision of a public choice theorist, Buchanan, he seems to attempt to 
restore the optimality framework, while stating that in certain cases, insurance may be non-optimal, 
even when individuals have risk-aversion, proving that in certain cases the market has actually been 
efficient when not intervening, thus preventing moral hazard. According to him, these ‘non-insurable’ 
medical care services would be those with price-elastic demand, and non-random nature (such as is the 
case of preventive medicine), therefore subject to moral hazard, due to demand being inflated by the 
existence of insurance coverage (which reduces point-of-service price for the patient). Thus, Pauly 
would then recommend that compulsory social insurance, as had been conceived by Arrow
15, would 
only be possible, and therefore should be restricted, to certain medical care services, with perfectly 
(price) inelastic demand
16.  
What I regard as being of incredible interest to notice, is the relationship between the publishing 
dates and authors of these articles with the creation of Medicare (and Medicaid), in 1965 (Pauly being, 
today, an advisor of its board), as a governmental institution providing insurance coverage only for the 
elderly and disabled (and indigents), with a historical work record, the U.S. remaining till today one of 
the  few  developed  nations  with  absence  of  universal  health  care,  even  after  all  effort  towards  it, 
endured recently by President Clinton (I shall address this further ahead).    
Furthermore, in my opinion this was clearly another victory of the  rational (public)  choice 
theory framework on health economic literature development, at the time. Pauly actually repudiated the 
“rather strongly emotive approach” of some previous authors
17, when regarding these overuses as a 
moral or ethical problem of “malingering” individuals suffering from “hypochondria”, rather than as 
                                                 
15 While certain authors(*) have counter-argued against Arrow’s case for government intervention, presenting selling and 
transaction costs as the reason for the absence (at the time) of commercial (private sector) insurance, Arrow defended his 
argument on the basis that these where dead-weight losses anyway, to be eliminated by compulsory social insurance. 
(*)  see  R.D.  Lees  and  R.G.  Rice  “Uncertainty  and  the  Welfare  Economics  of  Medical  Care:  Comment”,  American 
Economic Review, March 1965, 55, 140-54 
16 Citing Buchanan (The Inconsistencies of the National Health Service, 1964), he argues as a rational choice theorist 
(following Arrow) would, for the existence of an inconsistency if these non-insurable services were to be covered by market 
or government provided insurance. The nature of this inconsistency  would reside on  the  fact  that before  ‘purchasing’ 
insurance, the individual (or government) would have to account for the “indirect” cost of it (which should reflect expected 
excess  use,  due  to  moral  hazard).  This,  resulting  from  a  “prisoners’  dilemma”  equilibrium,  in  which  the  strategy  of 
“retaining use to prevent a rise in the insurance premium” would be strictly dominated by that of “excess use of care”, even 
though a better outcome would prevail from all beneficiaries cooperating and “retaining use”. Therefore, given inelastic 
demand, this inconsistency would imply inefficiency if individuals (or governments for them) were forced to purchase 
insurance. Notice the strong influences of RCT and other analytical tools developed at RAND, only a few years before (he 
actually cites Raiffa’s 1957 Games and Decisions). 
17  He  is  referring  to  “O.D.Dickerson,  Health  Insurance,  rev.  ed.  Homewood,  Ill,  1963”  and  “E.J.  Faulkner,  Health 
Insurance, New York 1960”.   12 
pure  rational  economic  behavior
18.  In  fact,  today,  these  authors’  writings  on  this  subject  can  be 
considered rather marginally, when compared to Pauly, a consecrated Health Economist. 
  
The NBER and the Neoclassical School 
More or less parallel to what was happening under RAND, governmental, and AMA influence, 
other things where happening in the academic world.  
As previously mentioned, by 1972, Grossman
19 was obtaining much wider recognition than 
Mushkin had had for a similar argument, for his article based on his earlier Columbia University PhD 
dissertation, to be published by the National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER), sponsored by the 
Commonwealth Fund and the National Center for Health Services Research and Development. By that 
time, the idea that individuals invest in themselves was beginning to be accepted, and Grossman’s 
formal model regards health as a stock of a commodity so that in order to maintain it above a minimum 
(death) level, generating a certain utility, you have to invest in it (as in Mushkin) by buying market 
goods (like medical care, nutrition, pharmaceuticals, etc), besides your own time. The model relates 
health stock depreciation with age, and the demand for it with the wage rate and education. He based 
his paper on a consumption and demand theoretical framework, thanking and referring the works on 
consumption theory of Gary Becker (his PhD program teacher), Lancaster, Muth, Michael, and Ghez, 
all published between 1965 and 1970
20. By that time, he clearly wasn’t a health economist, having this 
article consecrated him as one, after Victor Fuchs employed him at the NBER, in 1966, conditional on 
him writing on health economics (Grossman, 2004).  
This suggests to me a couple of questions I would like to see answered. Why was Grossman so 
successful using an argument that had been referenced nearly a decade before by Mushkin, clearly a 
precursor for the discipline, even though not much recognised as such? One could argue that this was a 
time women weren’t taken as seriously as men, but without loss of this argument’s worthiness, couldn’t 
it have been because Mushkin had brought up the subject right in the middle of the tug-of-war between 
National Health interests and private interests from the AMA lobby? Notice that health issues were 
necessarily  being  brought  up  by  technological  advance,  but  the  U.S.  government  had  not  yet  the 
validated interest on them, given by Medicare being finally signed into law in 1965 (see also note 12), 
nor the legitimate funding resources which enabled the strong investment in health economic studies 
                                                 
18 He actually criticizes Arrow for considering moral hazard as a market imperfection, “a defect in physician control, rather 
than as a simple response to price reduction”, which should be equated in the welfare proposition. 
19 Nowadays, Grossman directs the NBER’S Health Economics Program. 
20 Notice all of these publications were precisely after Medicare was signed into law, in 1965.   13 
which came thereafter
21, incremented by non-governmental initiatives, such as RAND’s or Ford’s, in a 
rational choice theory euphoria, or a “rationalizing capitalist democracy” (Amadae, 2003), as discussed 
previously. The context was, therefore, much more favourable to Arrow and Grossman’s work.   
On  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  answer  these  questions,  it  should  be  interesting  to  note  the 
evolution of Economic Thought at the time. The “new generation” of the NBER network, which had 
been created in 1920, was placing aside the empirically driven, econometric and statistically based 
theory of the old institutionalists, and adopting a neoclassical perspective, where theory came from 
pure abstraction of thought, only then followed by empirical verification, this put in very broad terms. 
The network of researchers was driving its way from the Chicago school, to Columbia University
22. It 
is precisely in this context that Gary Becker
23, a neo-classicist, new institutionalist leaves Chicago, in 
the late 50s, early 60s, and starts teaching PhD students at Columbia University, namely Grossman. 
The fact is that Grossman, in his 1972 article recognizes that most of this paper had been written at the 
Chicago’s Center for Health Administration Studies, having presented a preliminary version of it at the 
Second World Congress of the Econometric Society. Yet, Grossman moves, as Becker had done before, 
to Columbia, where he concludes his PhD dissertation, including this article, to be published by the 
NBER, now with a clear neoclassical dominance, as clearly is noted by its consumption and demand 
theoretical  framework,  certainly  very  different  from  his  presented  econometric  first  version,  or 




4. Since the 1980s: Unraveling into two paths 
 
RAND again, the AMA, the Insurance Industry and the U.S. Government  
                                                 
21 I will discuss these developments after the 80s, with the strong investment in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment.  
22 Note that Arrow, himself, had just been an integrating part of this network, sharing intellectual resources: “The years 
1946-1949 were spent partly as a graduate student at Columbia University, partly as a research associate of the Cowles 
Commission for Research in Economics at the University of Chicago, where I also had the rank of Assistant Professor of 
Economics  in  1948-1949”,  (from  Nobel  Lectures,  Economics  1969-1980,  Editor  Assar  Lindbeck,  World  Scientific 
Publishing Co., Singapore, 1992). ￿
23 It is relevant to note, that Becker had been precisely one of the most notable students of Milton Friedman, at Chicago, the 
‘positive economist’ who placed the emphasis, in terms of methodology, in the empirical, statistical and econometrical. In 
fact, as referred earlier, Friedman’s first studies, had involved the medical profession, through an econometric study.  
24 Mushkin  was both an economist  for the Division of Public Health Methods, Public Health Service, and a research 
associate at the John Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health. She based her initial studies in the U.S. 
National Health Survey.   14 
Though  the  neoclassical  trend  was  trying  to  establish  itself  also  on  the  Health  sector  of 
Economics, it seems to me this trend was let down in the 80s, only to recently resurge, possibly due to 
the  interactions  between  the  major  institutions  demanding  for  responses  and  empirical  studies  to 
shorter-term problems. I briefly describe the main forces behind this demand for studies. 
Besides the important role it played in the delay of Medicare creation, in the 50s and 60s, the 
American Medical Association (AMA) did continue to play an important role in influencing Health 
policy issues. Yet, what interests us most is its part in the stimulus of further literature and health 
economic thought, constituting a further example of why I believe Health Economics did develop, 
since the late 70s, into a practitioner driven subject. In 1979, Milton Friedman saw his and his wife’s 
Free to Choose published, later developing into a TV series aired by the Public Broadcasting Service 
(funded and founded with the help of Ford Foundation, in 1970). In it, he heavily criticized the AMA, 
asserting that it acted as a government-sanctioned “guild”
25 which had attempted to increase physicians'  
wages  and  fees  limit  by  influencing  limitations  on  the  supply  of  physicians  and  non-physician 
competition, therefore making illegitimate use of its privileged information and access to the health 
market, and exclusive know-how which allowed them to work as a lobby, exerting political pressure. 
Thus, Friedman was now empirically characterizing the asymmetry of information described by Arrow, 
as allowing for practitioners prosecution of self-interest which makes this sector deviate from the norm 
of perfect competition, and Pareto Optimality. Friedman also asserted that these actions had not only 
inflated the cost of healthcare in the United States, but had also caused a decline in the quality of 
healthcare. 
After the Cold-War ended, a number of intellectual and financial resources were now without a 
purpose, and as usually happens, institutions such as RAND had to find a justification for its existence. 
RAND started to diversify its research portfolio, beyond national security issues, namely investing and 
creating the Health “department”
26. As referred to earlier on, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
(HIE) was a major investment which motivated several studies, drifting theory to practitioner driven 
literature, namely on insurance effects and policy. 
                                                 
25Traditionally, this word was used to describe an association of craftspeople, possessing a certain exclusive know-how and 
expertise. Consider Friedman' s description of the guild' s operations:  
“One effect of restricting entry into occupations through licensure is to create new disciplines: in medicine, osteopathy and 
chiropractic are examples. Each of these, in turn, has resorted to licensure to try to restrict its numbers. The AMA has 
engaged in extensive litigation charging chiropractors and osteopaths with the unlicensed practice of medicine, in an attempt 
to restrict them to as narrow an area as possible. Chiropractors and osteopaths in turn charge other practitioners with the 
unlicensed practice of chiropractic and osteopathy.” 
 
26 See Apendix 1   15 
Weisbrod  (1991)
  27  described  the  exponential  post-World  War  II  growth  of  health  care 
expenditure,  attributing  it  more  to  the  development  of  new  technologies  than  inefficiently  great 
utilization due to insurance, which would drive up both costs of care and of insurance. At the same 
time,  expanding  insurance  coverage,  which  included  more  people  as  well  as  a  wider  definition  of 
coverage, had provided an increased incentive to the R & D sector to further develop new technologies, 
resulting in an interactive, virtuous circle. Finance of this sector had shifted from retrospective, cost-
based insurance coverage to prospective, exogenously determined pricing. This was similar to what had 
happened much earlier in the Education sector, and for Weisbrod, was the reason behind its slow 
development, contrary to Health. In sum, development issues were driving the focus of attention to 
insurance policies. 
Manning, Newhouse
28 et al. (1987), then affiliated at RAND
29, presented the final results of the 
HIE, examining the effects of varying levels of cost sharing (coinsurance plans) on the demand for 
medical  care  and  other  health  services,  clearly  proving  their  existence  and  strength  of  a  nonzero 
elasticity of demand. Yet, this was now done with a strong statistical and econometrical approach, 
based on a large scale HIE database, to what had been theoretically brought up by economists such as 
Arrow and Pauly during the Cold War. This important database was to constitute the foundations to 
most of the further literature on this subject, which from here onward assumed itself as much more 
empirically based and driven.   
Meanwhile, the debate for and against a universal health system was still on in the 1990s. The 
AMA  was  proposing  a  reform  of  the  U.S  health  care  system  (Health  Access  America)  to  include 
expansion of (private) health insurance coverage, lobbying for the change of federal tax codes to allow 
the current health insurance system (based on employment) to be purchased by individuals
30. It was 
part of the coalition between Conservatives, libertarians, and the insurance industry that defeated, in 
1994,  the  health  care  reform,  proposed  by  Hillary  Clinton  (and  President  Bill  Clinton)  towards  a 
universal  health  care  system
31,  through  a  well-organized  campaign  that  accused  it  of  being  over-
bureaucratic, and arguing on the base that Medicare funds were already predicted to run out by 2017. 
Clearly,  empirirically  driven  questions  were  being  brought  up  by  the  market,  by  consumers, 
                                                 
27 In his article he starts off by thanking several participants of his seminar at the RAND Corporation. 
28 J. P. Newhouse and W.G. Manning are currently editor and associate editor, respectively, for the leading journal in this 
subject: the Journal of Health Economics. 
29This research was conducted under the governmental grant 016B80, again from the Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
30 Their plan was to enable individuals to afford insurance through a series of refundable tax credits based on income (i.e, 
the lower your income, the greater your credit). 
31 It involved enforced mandate for employers to provide health insurance coverage to all of their employees through 
competitive but closely-regulated health maintenance organizations (HMOs).    16 
practitioners and policy makers, who wanted to understand and control for insurance policy making. 
Newhouse et al (1989) van Vliet (1992), Welch (1985), McCall and Wai (1983), for instance, dedicated 
themselves to evaluating the predictability of total expenditures in health services. Ellis and McGuire 
(2006) based their study on insurance plans adverse selection, in the 1996 and 1997 Medicare Standard 
Analytical  Files,  a  random  5%  sample  of  all  Medicare  beneficiaries  and  on  the  1996  and  1997 
Denominator files, for the elderly and disabled. It concluded as to the existence of rationalization in the 
choice  of  services  covered  by  capitation  based  insurance  health  plans,  which  bias  them  towards 
offering  less  coverage  of  more  predictable  services,  therefore  also  influencing  demand  (price- 
sensitive). For years Medicare had paid on the basis of age, gender, county and Medicaid status, which 
together explained only one percent of variance of total spending. Why it wasn’t based on the real 
causal factors of spending was a question needing to be answered.  Glazer and McGuire (2000) find a 
service selection distortion because of risk selection strategy from health plans, which choose their 
coverage so as to “selectively ration quantities of each type of service”, which then influence the choice 
of  plans  by  consumers,  based  on  expectations  of  its  coverage.  Public  health  plans  remained  in 
ignorance  of  the  real  explicative  forces  of  health  spending,  since  insurance  companies  distorted 
influence on demand, wanting to over-provide services which were disproportionally anticipated by 
wealthier  (healthier)  people  and  undersupply  services  disproportionally  anticipated  by  unprofitable 
(chronically ill, and older) people (supplied by public Medicare and Medicaid plans). Frank et al (2000) 
came to verify this theory, empirically, also confirmed by Mello et al (2002). They find incentives of 
Health Management Organizations in influencing demand, through their choice of coverage, covering 
more physician visits (which, in my point of view, could explain the coalition between the AMA and 
the  private  insurance  industry),  but  rationalizing  on  hospital  care  for  unpredictable,  random 
occurrences.  Interestingly,  these  authors  had  verified,  through  articulated  econometrically  based 
empirical studies, what had been abstractly proposed by Pauly (amongst others), in the 1960s.  
Recently, other authors have dueled with the issue of finding optimal coinsurance,  developing  
strongly  empirically  based  studies,  making  wide  use  of  econometric  techniques,  or  non-parametric 
tools, as did Manning and Marquis (1996), to estimate and articulate both demand for health insurance 
and for health care. Authors such as Sapelli and Vial (2003), have now started to diversify, using 
databases from their own nations and contextualizing as to their own national health system, in their 
case, to Chile but also narrowing down the scope of optimal policy analysis to the individual. On the 
other hand, others, such as Vera-Hernandez (2003)
32 have tried to innovate in the field through the 
                                                 
32 Published in the RAND Journal of Economics.   17 
application of less orthodox methods, in this a case structural estimation (of a principal-agent model), 
to such issues which have survived time, due to their omnipotent and omnipresent importance, since 
they were first referenced by economists such as Arrow, Pauly or Grossman.  
 
5. Conclusion 
What I believe is unquestionable, is that Health Economics, as a consecrated discipline, arose as 
an  applied  field  in  the  U.S.,  given  post-World  War  II  preeminent  health  issues  and  technological 
development,  but  also  as  a  consequence  of  ‘intellectual  diversification’,  stemming  from  Cold-War 
developed rational (and public) choice theory and analysis. Yet, history of health economic thought 
seems  to  have  had  a  rather  drastic  redirection  by  the  end  of  the  Cold-War,  which  made  both  the 
intellectual  and  financial  resources  available  to  answering  empirically-driven  questions,  with 
empirically-based studies, in a socio-political context in which Health had become a priority, and the 
‘optimal’ allocation of resources for the care of the sick and the promotion of health was found to be a 
complex matter, imbricated in a network of conflicting interests and a singular market . 
I also find evidence pointing to a development of the discipline into two distinct paths, or fields of 
research, each with their own researchers and approaches. The first, a more theoretical field of Health 
Economics,  officially  launched  by  Grossman  (but  previously  ploughed  by  Mushkin),  took  a  more 
theoretical path, rooted in Human Capital Theory, later giving way to recent literature regarding health 
as an investment, ranging from neoclassical models to structural, mathematical models using dynamic 
approaches to the broader sector of Health
33. The second field, recognized by Health Economists as the 
Health Care Economics approach, which I defend was brought up by Arrow’s characterization of the 
health care market and its specificities, ended up by taking a more empirical turn, strongly based on 
econometric techniques
34, mainly as a direct response to the demand for empirical studies, rising very 
much from practitioners, institutional and political forces, focusing on health market failures and the 
role of public intervention to assure health care to citizens. 
In  1998,  Blaug  had  remarked  that  “health  economics  would  seem  to  be  a  perfect  topic  for 
heterodox dissent and yet, surprisingly enough, radical economists and Marxists have not on the whole 
been attracted to health economics”. I believe this was because “mathematical economists”, such as 
                                                 
33 This is easily confirmed by observing a variety of health economic papers published in a wide range of generalist 
economic top journals. 
34 We are referring to most of the papers addressing health care economics published in specialized journals such as the 
Journal of Health Economics, Health Economics, amongst others.    18 
Grossman, Arrow, and their followers stepped forward and challenged themselves to solve problems 
such an unorthodox market posed, each giving origin to two distinct paths.  
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